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COMMENT
LEHNERT v. FERRIS FACULTY ASSOCIATION:* ACCOUNTING
TO FINANCIAL CORE MEMBERS: MUCH A-DUES
ABOUT NOTHING?
CAL yIN SIEMER **
INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act' ("NLRA") and the Railway Labor Act2 ("RLA") permit union security clauses' in private sector collective bargaining agreements.4 Public sector union security clauses are
authorized pursuant to state or federal law.5 Nevertheless, both union
nonmembers and financial core members' have made first amendment
U.S. -, 111 S. CL 1950 (1991)
I would like to thank the following for their help and encouragement: John Coppess, Lew Lipkin, Daniel Silverman, and Stephen Sturm.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1988).
2. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
3. Union security clauses are provisions found in "federally sanctioned contracts
between a labor union and an employer whereby the employer agrees to require his employees, as a condition of their employment, to affiliate with the union in some way." T.
Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts 4 (1977).
4. Both the NLRA and the RLA make negative grants, meaning that they allow
union security clauses simply by stating that they are not forbidden. The relevant language of the NLRA reads,
[N]othing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization...
to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the
thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date
of such agreement, whichever is the later.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988). Similarly, the RLA states,
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers... and a labor organization... shall be permitted... to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty
days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such
agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the
labor organization representing their craft or class.
45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1988).
Note that the RLA expressly preempts State law, while the NLRA does not. Consequently, a union security clause will be permitted by the NLRA if a State statute either
tolerates it or does not forbid it. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1988). See also Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 267 n.2 (1974)
("The NLRA, of course, permits certain union security agreements... except insofar as
they may violate state law.") (citation omitted). Furthermore, both the NLRA and RLA
require employer consent for a union security clause to become part of a collective bargaining agreement. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 751 n.6
(1988) (the NLRA and the RLA "confer on unions and employers authority to enter into
union-security agreements").
5. See T. Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts 217-31
(1977). Such union security clauses are generally modeled on the NLRA. See ict
6. A nonmember is an employee who, although not compelled to join a union or to
* -

**
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challenges to union security clauses. These challenges have taken two

forms, claiming that union security clauses violate either the first amendment freedom of association or the first amendment right to free expression, or both.7
Challenges based on the guarantee of freedom of association have

proved unsuccessful. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
constitutionality of union security clauses as a necessary intrusion on the
first amendment.' In contrast, challenges by dues objectors9 based on
freedom of expression have been sustained by the Supreme Court. I0 The
Court has also found a statutory basis in the NLRA to sustain a dues
objector's challenge to a union's improper use of dues money."
With one important question resolved-namely, that union security

clauses allow unions to collect dues money from objectors only in proportion to the amount that the organization expends on activities that
relate to collective bargaining-a perhaps more difficult issue took center
stage. Unions, members, courts and the National Labor Relations Board
maintain union membership therein, works under an agency shop arrangement that requires the payment of an agency fee to the union. See T. Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts 4-5 (1977). The Supreme Court has upheld agency shops
as another valid form of unionism allowed under the NLRA. See NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741-44 (1963).
Financial core members are employees working under a union security clause, who, as
a condition of employment, must maintain union membership. See GeneralMotors, 373
U.S. at 742. They become union members in name only, having "whittled down [their
membership] to its financial core." Id.
Full union membership is distinguished from the above categories by the greater privileges it grants and the responsibilities it imposes. For example, full members can vote on
whether or not to strike, but only full members are subject to fines as a result of internal
procedures for failing to honor a strike picket line. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 196-97 (1967).
7. See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
8. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225-26 (1977). International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 771 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
9. The term "dues objector" will be used to describe both financial core members
and nonmembers who object to a union's use of dues money for political or other purposes not related to the costs of representing the employee in collective bargaining. The
distinction between a financial core member and a nonmember is discussed above. See
supra note 6.
10. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-37 (1977).
11. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988). In
Beck, the Court held that the CWA, by using a dues objector's money for purposes other
than collective bargaining, had violated its "duty of fair representation" under the
NLRA. See id. at 738. The duty of fair representation is a judge-made concept derived
from court interpretations of the RLA and NLRA. It was first described, with reference
to the RLA in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R, 323 U.S. 192 (1944), as a "duty to
exercise fairly the power conferred upon [the union] in behalf of all those for whom it
acts." Id. at 203. The Supreme Court later found the same duty incumbent upon unions
authorized under the NLRA "to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of
those members, without hostility to any" that a union represents. Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). See also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (a
union has a "statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination toward any").
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("NLRB") have grappled with the newly emerged problem of defining
what activities "relate to" collective bargaining. 2 Although the
Supreme Court first attempted to answer this question in Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 3 confusion remained after that decision as to what criteria should be used to determine what expenditures a
union may or may not charge dues objectors. 14 While interested parties
anticipated that the Supreme Court would resolve this confusion in
Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty Association,' 5 the Court unfortunately failed to
6
do so.'
This Case Comment will analyze the Lehnert decision by examining its
historical precedents, the Court's methodology, the utility of the Court's
holding, and the case's likely impact. This Comment will also propose
solutions to the problems posed by Lehnert. Part I discusses the legislative history and prior case law involving union security clauses, nonmembers, financial core members, and the use of union dues. Part II explores
the Lehnert decision-the product of a severely divided court. In addition to delineating the Court's holding, this Part will also analyze the
decision in terms of prior Court rulings in this area and will devote particular attention to the Court's continued use of a methodology, originally developed in Beck, that commentators have termed "curious" " and
that reflects the Court's failure to "follow the usual rules of statutory
construction."' 8 Part III then analyzes the likely consequences of the
Lehnert decision for unions, union security clauses, the NLRB, and the
courts. Finally, this Case Comment offers possible solutions for the present debacle.
12. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) ("There will, of
course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities, for
which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective
bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited.").
13. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
14. See Swoboda, Union Security Clauses at Risk in Challenge to Dues, Wash. Post,
May 19, 1991, at 112, col.1 ("the [C]ourt [in Beck] did not specify whether the breakdown
[of dues spending] had to apply to each individual bargaining unit or whether the union
could simply break down its expenses at the national level").
15. -

U.S. -,

111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).

16. See Swoboda, supra note 13, at H2, col.l. One commentator has jabbed at the
Court's byzantine holding in Lehnert by remarking, "As an old saying goes, 'If you [as a
reader of the case] aren't confused, you don't understand the problem.'" Mazurak, The
Status of the Employment Relationship: The 1990-91 Supreme Court Term, 7 Lab. Law.
849, 868 (1991).
17. See Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck: Supreme Court Throws Unions
Out On Street, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 665, 667 (1989) [hereinafter Unions Out On Street].
18. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor Relations
Act The Statute, the Constitution and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 Harv. J. on Legis.
51, 72 (1990) [hereinafter Union Security Agreements].
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BACKGROUND

A. Legislative History
In 1935, in the midst of the Great Depression,' 9 Congress enacted the
Wagner Act, more popularly known as the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA") 20 . Stating that "[e]xperience has proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury,"2 1 Congress sought to establish and protect the right of workers to "full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ19. The Great Depression represents one of the great divides in the landscape of the
American experience. It is essential that the reader keep in mind the grave crisis-in
economic, social, and political terms-then facing the United States federal government.
As one historian notes, "[d]uring the two worst years, 1932 and 1933, the number of
totally unemployed was more than 12 million each year, and the average unemployment
rate was over 24 percent." L. Chandler, America's Greatest Depression 1929-1941, at 6
(1970). Even those lucky enough to find work fared little better: "[o]f all employed
workers, 56 percent were part-time, working an average of 59 percent of normal full
time.... The total money income of all workers in the form of wages and salaries fell
42.5 percent from 1929 to 1933." Id. at 35. The trauma of the 1930s shook the foundations of American institutions and called into question prior unassailable fundamental
principles upon which American society based itself. See K. Hill, Democracies in Crisis
2-3, 8-9 (1988). For a compilation of contemporaneous viewpoints on the meaning,
causes, and remedies of the Great Depression, see R. Himmelberg, The Great Depression
and American Capitalism (1968); see also T. Shachtman, The Day America Crashed 28892 (1979) (addressing the human impact of the crisis); D. Shannon, Between the Wars:
America, 1919-1941, at 116 (1965) (pointing out that, while the complete economic impact of the Great Depression can never be adequately gauged, "it is clear that the depression's impact on human beings was vast and horrible").
Prior to the Great Depression, one of the basic American liberties had been the right to
contract freely, as evidenced by the Supreme Court's much criticized decision in Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In striking down a state labor law that restricted the
working hours of bakers, the Lochner Court reasoned that "[t]he freedom of master and
employe [sic] to contract with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining
the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution." Id. at 64. This hostility to nascent labor law was overcome in large measure by
the harsh realities of the Great Depression and the need to create some balance between
employer and employee. As demonstrated by the Wagner Act, the regard for freedom of
contract was not so much supplanted as it was supplemented. Employer and employee
were still free to contract, but a growing recognition took hold in Congress that employees could only realistically exercise that liberty collectively. See C. Bufford, The Wagner
Act 1-5 (1941) (tracing the pre-Depression disdain of unions, the author notes that
change came "[a]s a result of the business depression that swept over the country in the
30's."). Id. at 2.
In summary, the climate of the Great Depression proved hospitable to the growth of
ideas previously anathema to the dominant American culture. In the efflux of the Crash,
unions took their firmest root.
20. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). The Wagner Act was a successor of § 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act. See Pub. L. No. 67, 48 Stat. 195, 198-99 (1933); H.
Millis & E. Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 27 (1950).
21. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
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ment or other mutual aid or protection."' The new legislation, which
covered employees in the private sector, contained an important provision that authorized both union security agreements' and the closed
shop.24 The latter proved immeasurably valuable to union organizing
because it required employees to be union members in order to be hired,
not just to maintain employment. As a consequence, union membership
grew at a sharp rate.25
Nevertheless, the closed shop drew criticism for creating overly powerful unions, 6 so Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act27 in 1947 to
amend the NLRA. The Taft-Hartley Act outlawed the closed shop,2 8
although it still permitted union security agreements to continue in a
modified fashion. 29 Furthermore, the 1947 amendments provided that
22. Id. at 450.
23. See supra note 3 (explaining union security clauses).
24. The closed shop is the most restrictive of union security agreements because it
requires an employee to be a member of the union in order to be hired. See T. Haggard,
Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts 4 1977.
Similar to the current language of the NLRA, see supra note 4, the relevant language of
the original Wagner Act reads: "[Nothing in this Act... shall preclude an employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of
employment membership therein." National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L No. 198, 49
Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
Importantly, the Wagner Act spoke only to nationalpolicy. States were free to pursue
their own labor policy regarding union security agreements and closed shops. See Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301,
307-12 (1949).
25. The Wagner Act helped unions to quadruple their size. Prior to the Taft-Hartley
amendments, between 1935 and 1947, labor unions grew from fewer than 4 million workers to over 14 million union members. See A. Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy
12 (1960).
26. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported in 1947 that "the
closed shop... creates too great a barrier to free employment to be longer tolerated." S.
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 National Labor Relations
Board, Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act 1947, at 412 (1985)
[hereinafter I Legislative History 1947].
The abuses of the closed shop caused such a shift in public opinion that, as one commentator observed,
[i]t was thought by many that unions had become so powerful as to menace
collective bargaining itself, individuals, minority groups and the political status
quo. Some union leaders had so abused their power as to cast doubt on the
responsibility of the whole organized labor movement. ... Public opinion was
growing in the direction of a desire to curb unions to protect the public interest.
J. Dempsey, The Operation of the Right-to-Work Laws 11-12 (1961).
27. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141
(1988)) [hereinafter Taft-Hartley Act].
28. See id. § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. at 140-41 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1988)). In Section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, employees could still be required to become union members within thirty days after employment commenced. Unions could
not, however, withhold membership and deny an employee work if that employee agreed
to pay dues and initiation fees. See id; see also NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734, 742 (1963) (Taft-Hartley amendments "abolished the closed shop").
29. In 1947, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted that, despite
the abuses of the closed shop, unions and employers should be free to "enter into agreements requiring all the employees in a given bargaining unit to become members 30 days
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state law could prohibit union security clauses. 3 °
For employees in the railroad and airline industries, Section 2 of the
Railway Labor Act ("RLA") governs union security agreements.3 1 Prior
to 1951, union security agreements had been illegal under the RLA. In
that year, however, Congress amended the RLA to match the NLRA on
the matter of union security clauses-except that, in contrast to the
NLRA, state laws were explicitly preempted under the RLA.3 2
An examination of legislative history underscores that, while Congress
3
permitted closed shops in 193533 and intended to outlaw them in 1947,

the legislators understood the essential need of unions to be able to compel the financial support of their beneficiaries. For example, the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor reported in 1947 that it had considered the argument that "[i]n the absence of [union security clauses] many
employees sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish
by
'35
collective bargaining will refuse to pay their share of the cost."

The Taft-Hartley Act was thus an attempt to balance the competing
interests of employees who wished to work in a union shop without becoming union members with the union majority's interest in avoiding
"free riders." 36 The balance struck by Congress permitted union security
after being hired." 1 Legislative History 1947, supra note 26, at 413. Senator Taft, chairman of the Committee and the eponymous sponsor of the amendment, declared that the
bill took a middle position between a closed shop and the allowance of free ridersemployees who benefit from the gains of working under a union contract but who contribute nothing to the support of the union. See 93 Cong. Rec. S5036, 5088, (daily ed.
May 9, 1947), reprintedin 2 National Labor Relations Board, Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, at 1421 [hereinafter 2 Legislative History 1947].
Essentially, the bill countenanced the continuance of union shops because of their widespread existence, and because removing them "probably would bring on more strikes
than it would cure." Id. at 1010.
While some wanted to eliminate union security clauses altogether, Senator Taft did not
share this view. He stated his unwillingness "to go to the extent of abolishing the possibility of a union-shop contract," but rather wanted to address the "problem of dealing
with the abuses which had appeared." Id. at 1420.
30. See Taft-Hartley Act, supra note 27, § 14(b), 61 Stat. at 151 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b) (1988)).
31. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1988).
32. See id. State law is not preempted under the NLRA. See Taft-Hartley Act, supra
note 27, § 14(b), 61 Stat. at 151 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1988). For a
comparison of the union security language of the NLRA and the RLA, see supra note 4.
The primary distinction between the NLRA and the RLA-that is, the preemption or
non-preemption of state law-is more significant to the later discussion of constitutional
matters. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
33. See 78 Cong. Rec. S4229, 4230 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1934) (article by Sen. Wagner),
reprintedin 1National Labor Relations Board, Legislative History of the National Labor
Relations Act 1935, at 25 (1949) [hereinafter 1 Legislative History 1935] ("Congress has
not intended to illegaliz[e] the closed shop."). Senator Wagner also added that "the new
bill makes it perfectly clear that the closed shop is not illegal."). I Legislative History
1935, supra at 39.
34. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
35. 1 Legislative History 1947, supra note 26, at 412.
36. The Taft-Hartley Act evoked as much debate as did passage of the Wagner Act
twelve years earlier. Some of the harsher criticisms are contained in R. Boyer & H.
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agreements to continue, but also prevented unions from denying membership-and hence employment-to employees willing to "pay the same
dues as other members of the union."' 37 Specifically, the Taft-Hartley
amendment outlawed the closed shop and created a thirty day "zone in
which an employee could exercise" his right to join or not to join a
union, "without fear of employer or union retaliation.1 38 At the same
time, however, the Act prohibited such an employee from becoming a
free rider, and unions could still require the employee, under pain of job
loss where a union security agreement was in effect, "to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership." 9

While the NLRA thus permits a union to collect dues, nowhere does
the legislation limit what use the union may make of those dues. The
legislative history reveals a similar lack of Congressional intent to restrict
a union in its use of dues money.' Nevertheless, significant questions
Morais, Labor's Untold Story 347-48 (1977). Fred Hartley, co-sponsor of the bill, authored an earlier book defending the Taft-Hartley Act. See generally F. Hartley, Our
New National Labor Policy (1948) (defending Taft-Hartley Act).
37. 93 Cong. Rec. S4387, 4400 (daily ed. April 30, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft),
reprinted in 2 Legislative History 1947, supra note 29, at 1142; accord Union Security

Agreements, supra note 18, at 102 (discussing Congressional purpose to prevent free
riders).
38. Note, Section 8(b)(1)(A)from Allis-Chalmers to Pattern Makers' League: A Case
Study in JudicialLegislation, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1409, 1442 (1986).

39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1988). While the concern over "free riders" was a genuine
one for the Congress that enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, the primary thrust of the amendment was unquestionably to correct the abuses of the closed shop. Senator Taft stated as
much, seeing the bill as ensuring "that a man can get a job without joining the union....
The fact that the employee will have to pay dues to the union seems to me to be much less
important. The important thing is that the man will have the job." 2 Legislative History
1947, supra note 29, at 1422.
40. Actually, the House version of the bill contained language that "[m]embers of any
labor organization shall have the right to be free from unreasonable or discriminatory
financial demands of such organization." I Legislative History 1947, supra note 26, at
176. This language grew out of a concern that unions were compelling members to contribute to political causes and candidates that the individual member might otherwise
oppose. See id at 295.
While the Senate declined to accept the House's language, it did recognize the desirability of empowering the NLRB to monitor dues and initiation fees, and thereby to prevent unions from charging exorbitant fees. The final bill added a new section-8(b)(5)that makes it an unfair labor practice for unions to require initiation fees that the NLRB
"finds excessive or discriminatory under the circumstances." Taft-Hartley Act, supra
note 27, § 8(b)(5), 61 Stat. at 142 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(5) (1988)).
The Senate, however, adopted the new section only after it was understood that section
8(b)(5) would not allow the NLRB to regulate union expenditures. See, eg., 2 Legislative
History 1947, supra note 29, at 1579 (wherein the Senate Committee Report points out
that the NLRB should not be empowered to regulate union expenditures); id. at 1623
(Senator Taft declares as "unfounded" the fear that section 8(b)(5) will lead to outside
regulation of union expenditures).
It is apparent that, if the legislature intended to impose restrictions upon the use of
dues money by unions, the evidence would be found in the extensive debates. Such evidence is lacking.
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arose under the Taft-Hartley amendment. 41 What did it mean if an employee did not want to join the union where a union security agreement
was in force?4 2 Did the employee qualify as a union member if she or he
paid the same dues? Did such an employee even have to pay the same
dues? 43 These matters were left for the courts to sort out.
B.

Case Law

In one of the earliest challenges to the efficacy of union security agreements following the Taft-Hartley amendments, Radio Officers' Union v.

NLRB,

4

the Supreme Court determined that the "legislative history

clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent utilization of union
security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of
union dues and fees."'45 This decision thus defined the enforceable scope

of a union security agreement. A union could not discriminate or seek to
discharge dues-paying employees in order to encourage "employees to

46
join [unions], retain membership, or stay in good standing in a union.",

The employee who desired neither to join a union nor to maintain good
standing therein could nonetheless retain employment so long as dues
were paid.
The Supreme Court elaborated on this theme in NLRB v. GeneralMotors Corp.,' where it found that the Taft-Hartley Act had not only eliminated closed shops, but had also altered the basic definition of union
"membership." The Court stated,
[T]he 1947 amendments not only abolished the closed shop but also
made significant alterations in the meaning of 'membership' for the
41. One contemporary commentator actually predicted that later litigation would follow due to ambiguities in the statute. See Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1947).
42. This, of course, assumes that the collective bargaining agreement is in a state that
sanctions union security clauses. Twenty-nine states have such laws, while the other
twenty-one are so-called "right to work" states that forbid compulsory unionism. See
United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1564 v. City of Clovis, 735 F. Supp.
999, 1002-03 (D. N.M. 1990); L. Troy, Union Sourcebook, Membership, Structure, Finance, Directory 7-9 (1985) [hereinafter Troy, Union Sourcebook].
43. There are financial reasons other than dues payments why employees sometimes
forgo union membership. In many cases, the employee seeks to avoid union discipline in
the form of fines for infractions of union by-laws, or for failure to honor the union's
picket line. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 481 U.S.
573, 595 (1987) ("union members have a right to resign from a union at any time and
avoid imposition of union discipline") (emphasis in original); Pattern Makers' League v.
NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 100-16 (1985) (employees who resigned from the union during strike
and returned to work could not be fined by the union); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB,
347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954) ("the policy of the [NLRA] is to insulate employees' jobs from
their organizational ights.... allow[ing] employees to freely exercise their rights to join
unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union without
imperiling their livelihood").
44. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
45. Id. at 41.
46. Id. at 42.
47. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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purposes of union-security contracts .... It is permissible to condition
employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon
payment of fees and dues. 'Membership' as a condition of employment
is whittled down to its financial core."
The Court further stated that, while employees had the option of full
membership, the employee was still required to pay "the same monetary
support as [in] the union shop. Such a difference between the union and
agency shop may be of great importance in some contexts, but for present purposes it is more formal than real." 4 9 In this way, the Court had
defined a new category of union membership-the "financial core" member. The financial core member had to pay "the same monetary support"5 as did other union members.
Through another line of cases, the Court developed the concept that
dues objectors may be charged only a reduced fee that is proportional to
the amount that the union expends for collective bargaining out of total
union spending that includes monies for other purposes, such as political
lobbying. In Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson,5 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a union security clause, authorized
by the RLA, against a first amendment challenge based on freedom of
association. 2 The Court declared that "the requirement for financial
support of the collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause and does not violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments." 5 3
The Court reserved judgment, however, on the matter of whether the use
of dues to "forc[e] ideological conformity" would constitute a violation
of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of expression.' That issue
48. Id.at 742 (emphasis added).
49. IdL at 744.
50. Id
51. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
52. The first amendment states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the first amendment as conferring a right to freedom of association "for the purposes of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving [those] other individual liberties." Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528
(1960) (Black, J., concurring) ("freedom of association" is a first amendment right "entitled to no less protection than any other First Amendment right").
53. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. In this instance, the Court was interpreting a union
security clause pursuant to the legislative grant found in section 2 Eleventh of the RLA.
See 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1988). As will become evident later in this Comment,
however, the Court's decisions have reduced the distinction between the NLRA and the
RLA with respect to interpretation of union security clauses and the chargeability of
expenses to dues objectors. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
54. See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
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was presented for consideration in InternationalAssociation of Machinists
v. Street.55
In Street, the Supreme Court validated a union's right to compel dues
payment,5 6 although it circumscribed that right by excluding those dues
sought for political purposes. 57 Once again, the Court avoided the con-

stitutional question, relying instead on its own standard for construing

statutes. 58 The Court suggested that an appropriate remedy for an unauthorized expenditure might be "restitution to each individual employee
of that portion of his money which the union expended.., for the political causes to which he had advised the union he was opposed." 59
In a later case under the RLA, the Supreme Court in Ellis v. Brother-

hood of Railway Clerks6' held that although preemption of state law implicated constitutional concerns, 6 1 a union security clause's "interference

with First Amendment rights is [nonetheless] justified by the governmen-

tal interest in industrial peace."' 62 Nevertheless, as in Street, the majority
reaffirmed that a "union [may not] ... spend an objecting employee's
money to support political causes." 63 After examining contested union
expenditures, the Ellis Court found some expenses to be chargeable 6 4 and
other expenses not chargeable 65 to the dues objectors. In doing so, the
Court began the difficult process of delineating expenses-a process that
earlier it had expressly tried to avoid.66
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,67 the Supreme Court finally
55. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
56. See id. at 746-47. Like Hanson, Street involved interpretation of a union security
clause permissible under the RLA. See supra note 53.
57. See Street, 367 U.S. at 770. A dissenter, however, must make his or her objections
known to the union. See id. at 774.

58. See id. at 750. The Court struggled with constitutional concerns because the
RLA preempts State right-to-work laws. This, in turn, implied governmental action subject to constitutional scrutiny. The Court termed the constitutional issues to be "questions of the utmost gravity." Id. at 749. Nevertheless, the Court took safe harbor in its
doctrine that "[flederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality." Id. In dissent, Justice Black argued that the constitutional matter of
freedom of expression and use of union dues should be settled, and that he would find
that the first amendment was violated when a union used a member's dues to support
political causes that the member personally opposed. See id. at 788-91 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
59. Id. at 775. The Supreme Court reinforced its holding in Street in Railway Clerks
v. Allen. See 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963). It expanded its proposed remedy beyond a restitution of dues to include "a reduction of future ... exactions ...

tion." Id. at 122.
60. See Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1984).

by the same propor-

61. Id.
62. Id. at 455-56.
63. Id. at 438.
64. The chargeable expenses included social activities, union publications, and convention expenses. See id. at 456-57.

65. These non-chargeable costs were for organizing costs and non-collective bargaining litigation expenses. See id. at 453, 457.
66. See Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).

67. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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answered the question of whether it was constitutional for a union to use
an objector's dues for non-collective bargaining activities. Because
Abood involved a public sector union,6" the case implicated state action
and the Court could no longer avoid addressing the constitutional concerns. The Court in Abood upheld the constitutional validity of the public sector union,6 9 but also found that the union's expenditure of a
nonmember's dues on political activities violated that nonmember's first
amendment right to freedom of expression.7 °
In Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson,7" also a public
sector case, the Supreme Court refined its holding in Abood. The Court
announced in Hudson that a union must follow "[p]rocedural safeguards" in order to protect a dissenter's first amendment rights as articulated in Abood.72 Henceforth, unions would be required to give an
accounting to nonmembers as to how the fee was determined, to provide
an opportunity for the nonmember to challenge the basis of the fee before
an impartial third party, and hold disputed fees in escrow while any challenge is before the decisionmaker.7 3 Hudson is thus significant because it
imposed upon unions the affirmative burden of instituting procedural
safeguards to insure the protection of dues objectors' first amendment

rights.
The state of the law from Hanson to Hudson thus reveals an evolving
framework devised by the Court to address the issue of dues objectors
working under union security clauses. While constitutional inquiries
were proper under the RLA and in the public sector, the Court had fashioned labor law in a manner not envisioned by Congress. 4 Essentially,
the Court had found that government-sanctioned union security clauses
imposed a burden upon the unions that benefited from these clauses. Unions were obligated not only to refrain from using a dues objector's
money for non-collective bargaining expenses, but also to insure that
they did not erroneously collect money in excess of the dues objector's
fair share of collective bargaining expenses. While the Court anchored
its decisions on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, it is appar68. Public sector union members are employees of federal, state and local governments who have statutory authority to belong to unions. At one time, collective bargaining by public sector employees was not only unheard of, but was illegal in most cases. In
certain states, public sector unions are still legally prohibited. See T. Haggard, Compulsory Unionism, the NLRB, and the Courts 210-13 (1977).
69. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 227-32.
70. See iL at 235-36. The first amendment protects freedom of expression. The
Supreme Court stated in New York Times v. Sullivan that "'[o]ne main function of the
first amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and resolve
public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be resolved in favor
of freedom of expression rather than against it.'" 376 U.S. 254, 302 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring in result) (quoting Douglas, The Right of the People 41 (1958)).
71. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
72. See id at 302.
73. See id at 310.
74. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ent that the Court's statutory interpretation was actually driven by the
underlying first amendment issues.75

If it was legitimate (although problematic in interpretation) for the
Court to rely upon first amendment concerns when deciding cases under

the RLA or in the public sector, the Court crossed the line when it carried over the import of those cases into the private arena governed by the
NLRA. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck,7" the Supreme
Court finally faced the constitutional question of freedom of expression
and the use of an objector's dues in private sector employment. 77 As
previously, the Court avoided addressing the constitutional questions in
favor of a statutory construction. First, the Court determined that its
interpretation of the RLA in InternationalAssociation of Machinists v.

Street 71 controlled its interpretation of the NLRA in Beck. 79 The Court
justified this approach by claiming that "Congress intended the same language to have the same meaning in both statutes."

0

Next, the Beck

Court interpreted Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA as authorizing a union to
collect dues under a union security agreement only to the extent that
those dues contributed to collective bargaining costs.8 '
The decision in Beck evoked vociferous criticism of the Court's methodology. s2 For instance, in determining that the Street decision was con75. See Kohler, Setting the Conditionsfor Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First
Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 149, 150-51,
190-200 (1990); Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act
Dues Objector Cases, 41 Hastings L.J. 1,2 (1989)[hereinafter Constitutional Values].
76. 487 U.S. 735 (1988). In a note of historical irony, Justice Brennan, author of the
Court's opinion in Beck, faced a similar situation while he served on the New Jersey
Supreme Court. At issue in Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J.
172, 176, 98 A.2d 673, 674-75 (1953), was the improper use by a school board of public
funds to campaign for the passage of funding for school building programs. In language
similar to that found in Beck and other dues objectors cases, Brennan framed the issue as
a question of "the extent to and manner in which the funds may with justice to the rights
of dissenters be expended." Id. at 181, 98 A.2d 677. Brennan, who wrote that opinion as
well, found that the school board had exceeded its implied statutory authority. See id. at
179-80, 98 A.2d 676-77. What is strikingly parallel in this case is that Brennan preferred
to use implied statutory limits, rather than constitutional concerns, in a case involving a
governmental entity infringing upon the freedom of expression of citizens. It is no wonder, then, that if Citizens did not call for a constitutional basis in Brennan's eyes, then
Beck certainly should not have. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
77. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 735. In all other cases from Hanson to Hudson, the
Supreme Court was concerned only with cases arising under the RLA and in the public
sector.
78. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
79. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
80. Id. at 747.
81. See id. at 762-63.
82. See, e.g., Union Security Agreements, supra note 18, at 54 (criticizing the Court's
interpretation of section 8(a)(3) as not being supported by the statute's words, administrative interpretation, or legislative history); Unions Out on Street, supra note 17, at 680
(legislative history does not support Beck Court's interpretation of the statute and lack of
state action renders first amendment claims invalid); Comment, Section 8(a)(3) Limitations to the Union's Use of Dues-Equivalents: The Implicationsof Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1567 (1989) (criticizing Beck Court's
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trolling, the Court worked backwards, using a 1951 amendment to the
RLA to interpret a 1947 amendment of the NLRA.P3 Furthermore, the
Beck decision created significant uncertainty as to how to apply its holding, specifically leaving unresolved the question of how a union must de-

termine what activities it may compel a dues objector to finance.14 It was
thus against a background of criticism and confusion that the Supreme
Court decided Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty Association.s
II:

LEHNERT V. FERRIS FACULTY ASSOCIATION

A.

8 6

Facts

The plaintiffs in Lehnert were six tenured members of the faculty of
Ferris State College ("Ferris"). 7 The defendant, Ferris Faculty Association ("FFA"), was an affiliate of the Michigan Educational Association
("MEA") and the National Education Association ("NEA"). Under authority of a Michigan statute, FFA served as the exclusive bargaining
agent of the Ferris faculty. 88 Membership in FFA, moreover, automatically included membership in the parent organizations, MEA and
NEA. 9
Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and pursuant
to Michigan state law, Ferris college deducted a yearly total of $284 from
determination of issues without any independent statutory ground) [hereinafter Implications of Beck]. But cf Constitutional Values, supra note 75, at 2 (proposing that the
NLRB expand its use of the Beck principles and factor in the underlying constitutional

concerns in its applications).
83. See Unions Out On Street, supra note 82, at 668; see also supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text (discussing the Taft-Hartley Act).
84. See, eg., ConstitutionalValues, supra note 74, at 6 ("a plethora of issues loom");
Swoboda, supra note 14, at H2, col.1 (discussing issues unresolved by Beck, including
how a union should account to a dissenter); see also National Labor Relations Board
Office of the General Counsel Memorandum GC 88-14 1-2 (Nov. 15, 1988), (in issuing
guidelines to the agency on how to apply Beck, the General Counsel notes that, because
Beck was decided on nonconstitutional grounds and is deduced from the RLA and public
sector cases that employ constitutional bases, courts may yet hold that the RLA and
public sector case law should not apply to the NLRA) (on file with Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter NLRB General Counsel Memorandum].
85. - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (1991).
86. The summary of facts presented here is derived from the stipulated and
adjudicated facts presented in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, I ll S. Ct.
1950 (1991); 881 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); 643 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
87. Two of the original six plaintiffs retired before the suit was decided. See Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1308 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
88. See Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1308; see also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 423.210-11
(West 1978 & Supp. 1991) (allowing collection of service fee by state public employees'
unions and providing for exclusive representation); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 408.477
(West 1985) (authorizing Michigan to deduct service fees from employees covered by a
public sector collective bargaining agreement without the employee's consent).
89. See Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1308. This arrangement is typical of union structure
in the United States. As one commentator has noted, "[tihe structure of organized labor
in the United States consists of 4 basic units, [l]the local union, [2]the intermediate or
district organization, [3]the regional, national and international unions and [4]the federation of unions." Troy, Union Sourcebook, supra note 42, at 5-1.
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plaintiffs' paychecks and remitted it to the union as an agency shop fee. 90
Of each $284, FFA received $24.80, MEA received $211.20, and NEA
received $48.00.91 The plaintiffs never joined the FFA, however; they
were simply nonmembers who had to pay service fees.

Claiming violations of rights secured by the first and fourteenth
amendments, the dues objectors brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983, 1985, and 1986.92 The plaintiffs alleged that state law compelled them to pay an agency shop fee to the union, and that the union
did not apply this fee exclusively to purposes related to collective bargaining activities.9 3 In essence, the plaintiffs demanded an accounting
from FFA, and challenged its expenditures in the areas of contributions
to the parent organizations, union publications, union conventions, and
litigation costs. 94 Finally, the plaintiffs challenged the procedures implemented by the FFA to set and collect service fees. 95

The District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that: (1)
certain union expenditures were chargeable to the dissenters, including
lobbying related to collective bargaining activities, union conventions, social activities, and litigation expenses; 96 (2) some expenditures were not

chargeable to the nonmembers as a matter of law, including organizing

costs and a loan to another union for an illegal strike;97 and (3) still other
expenditures were not chargeable where the FFA failed to sustain the
burden of proving that those expenditures were made for chargeable
activities. 98
Following a partial settlement,9 9 the plaintiffs made a limited appeal to
the Sixth Circuit. They claimed that the district court "erred in holding
that the costs of certain disputed union activities were constitutionally

chargeable" to them."°° Specifically, the plaintiffs appealed their objec-

90. See Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1308-10.
91. See id. at 1310. This monetary flow is another typical feature of American unions. As the same commentator relates, "[t]he flows of membership payments essentially
reflect the structure.... Membership funds typically go from the local to intermediate
unions and to the parent national or international to which they belong." Troy, Union
Sourcebook, supra note 42, at 5-3.
92. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (W.D. Mich. 1986);
see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 (1988). Section 1983 provides a cause of action if
a state actor deprives the plaintiff of a federal right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). In
Lehnert, plaintiffs filed substantive due process claim for dues money under section 1983.
See Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1307. Section 1985 provides a cause of action for conspiracies to deprive persons of federal rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1988). Finally, section
1986 gives a cause of action when a state actor mentioned in section 1985 neglects to
avert deprivations it could otherwise have prevented. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1988).
93. See Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1307.
94. See id. at 1307-12.
95. See id. at 1307.
96. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 1306, 1324-25, 1328 (W.D.
Mich. 1986).
97. See id. at 1324-25, 1327.
98. See Lehnert, 643 F. Supp. at 1328.
99. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 881 F.2d 1388, 1390 (6th Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 1390.
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tions to charges for: (1) lobbying and electoral politics; (2) bargaining,
litigation, and other activities on behalf of persons not in the plaintiffs'
bargaining unit; (3) public relations efforts; (4) miscellaneous professional activities; (5) meetings and conventions of the parent unions; and
(6) preparations for a potentially illegal strike."0 ' The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's prior holdings that the expenses were chargeable, 10 2 and the Lehnert plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. In 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 0 3 The Court
framed the issue as "concerning the constitutional limitations, if any,
upon the payment, required as a condition of employment, of dues by a
nonmember to a union in the public sector."'14
B.

The Lehnert Decision

The Lehnert case drastically divided the Court and revealed a number
of varying approaches on the part of the justices. 0 5 Justice Blackmun
wrote the opinion for the Court, but was joined by only Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and White in his entire opinion." 6 Justice Marshall wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part."0 Justice Scalia
concurred in part in the judgment and dissented in part. 0 Justice
Scalia's opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor and Souter, and by Jus-

tice Kennedy in part. Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part, concurring with Justice Scalia in part, and
dissenting in part." 9
The majority opinion in Lehnert declared that, while a "case-by-case
analysis" is warranted when "determining which activities a union constitutionally may charge to dissenting employees," several guidelines may
be applied to make such determinations." 0 As a test, Justice Blackmun
explained, chargeable activities must: (1) be "'germane' to collective
bargaining activity"; (2) be "justified by the government's vital policy
interest in labor peace and avoiding 'free riders' "; and (3) "not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allow101. See idl at 1391.
102. See id at 1394.
103. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2616 (1990).
104. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1954-55 (1991).
105. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 11 S. Ct. 1950, 1954 (1991); see
also Figure 1 (chart depicting the Lehnert decision). The Lehnert decision can be difficult
to decipher, as one commentator has noted, see supra note 16.
106. See Lehnert, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. at 1954.
107. See Lehnert - U.S. -, 11 S. Ct. at 1966-75 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
108. See id at 1975-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
109. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1981-82 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, concurring with Justice Scalia in part,
and dissenting in part).
110. See id at 1959.
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ance of an agency or union shop."1 1
The Court attempted to apply this new test to the facts in Lehnert, but
the inconsistencies and division it produced revealed the test's inadequacy. As an initial matter, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they may be charged only for those
collective bargaining activities undertaken directly on their behalf. The
Court reasoned that to require a direct correlation between expenditures
and the benefit to an individual nonmember "would be to ignore the unified-membership structure under which many unions ... operate.""' 2
Therefore, the Court concluded, a union may charge a dissenter a "prorata share of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities of
its state and national affiliates, even if those activities were not performed
' 13
for the direct benefit of the objecting employees' bargaining unit."
The Court also determined that the FFA could use a nonmember's
dues to finance political lobbying aimed at achieving the legislative ratification of a collective bargaining agreement.' 1 4 The majority, however,
did not allow a union to charge a dissenter for political lobbying to raise
funds in support of public education, an activity that arguably is germane
to the collective bargaining interests of a teachers' union." 5 Furthermore, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, the Court deviated
from its earlier decisions by improperly substituting "ratification" for
"negotiation" as the touchstone of what lobbying would be
6
permissible.1
In a similar manner, the Court held that expenditures for public relations activities may not be charged to dissenters, while simultaneously it
validated as chargeable the costs of union publications that concern the
nonmember's industry or occupation generally.I" This distinction is untenable, as it is hard to distinguish public relations activity from germane
collective bargaining activity when a public sector union is involved.
Such unions necessarily depend on the public's goodwill to secure legislative contract ratification. Further, it seems difficult to discern the distinction between a public relations activity (nonchargeable), and a union
publication that disseminates information on "teaching and education
111. Id.; see also Fig. I (chart depicting the Lehnert decision).
112. Id. at 1961.
113. Id.
114. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 1959 (1991).
115. See id.at 1963. The Supreme Court had recognized earlier in Eastex Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978), that "[t]he 74th Congress knew well enough that labor's
cause often is advanced on fronts other than collective bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate employment context." Id. at 565. The Lehnert decision is at
odds with that stated principle.
116. As Justice Marshall stated: "The key phrase in this new standard is... 'ratification or implementation'... That language departs dramatically from our prior decisions,
which uniformly refer to negotiation and administration as the touchstones for determining chargeability." Lehnert, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. at 1967 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
117. See id. at 1964.
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generally,... [and] award programs of the MEA and other miscellaneous matters" (chargeable)."'
The Court also allowed a union to apply a dissenter's dues towards the
cost of sending delegates to state and national conventions, under the
assumption that such gatherings will be germane to collective bargaining.'1 9 Justice Blackmun, however, declared that a union could not benefit from a like presumption when it came to extra-unit litigation costs.' 2 °
In fact, despite acknowledging that some extra-unit litigation may benefit
the dissenter's unit (and hence should be chargeable), Blackmun urged a
strict approach that would forbid using a dissenter's dues for any litigation except that specifically related to his bargaining unit. 2 '
Finally, after distinguishing strike-related expenses for a lawful strike
(chargeable) from strike-related expenses when the strike is unlawful
(nonchargeable), the majority nonetheless held that all strike preparation
expenses are chargeable, even if the anticipated strike would be illegal.
The Court reasoned that strike preparation activity is "an effective bar2
gaining tool" and thus is germane to collective bargaining activities.I
It is again difficult to square the Court's logic here with other parts of
its decision. For example, if the Court will sanction preparation for an
illegal strike as germane to collective bargaining activities, on the
grounds that such preparation is an effective bargaining tool, why then is
legal political lobbying a less effective bargaining tool for a public sector
union? Following the Court's logic, a union could charge a dues objector
for strike preparation but could not charge him or her for political lobbying to pass a bill that would allow a public sector union to strike, and
thus legitimize that activity.
In sum, the Supreme Court in Lehnert devised a new formula for determining what expenditures a union may permissibly charge nonmembers working in an agency shop.' 2 3 Applying this formula to the facts in
Lehnert, the majority concluded that political lobbying, public relation
activities, and expenses of an illegal strike were nonchargeable. On the
other hand, and with little logical consistency, the Court sustained as
chargeable any expenses related to conventions, strike preparation, and
118. Id
119. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 11
I S. Ct. 1950, 1964-65 (1991).
120. See id at 1963-64.
121. See id There is some question as to whether Lehnert should be read as standing
for Blackmun's declaration on litigation costs, or if this part of the opinion is dictum. A
close reading of the decision would seem to indicate that Blackmun's opinion did not
achieve a majority on this point. Justice Marshall dissented from this portion of the
opinion. See id. at 1954. In fact, at least one union counsel reading the decision has
concluded that "[tihis portion of [Blackmun's] opinion, however, did not command a
majority." Letter from Jonathan P. Hiatt, General Counsel of Service Employees [International Union] to All Union Locals and Their Attorneys (July 5, 1991) (on file at the
Fordham Law Review).
122. See Lehnert, - U.S. -,

Ill S. Ct. at 1965.
123. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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portions of union publications dealing with the nonmember's occupation
or industry generally.
C. Analysis
In his dissent, Justice Scalia correctly identified the flaws inherent in
the Court's new test. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that "each one of
the three 'prongs' of the test involves a substantial judgment call," such
as "[w]hat is 'germane'? What is 'justified'? What is a 'significant' additional burden?"'2 4 Thus, the test "seems calculated to perpetuate [the]
give-it-a-try litigation of monetary claims that are individually insignificant."' 5 This means, of course, that the Court has raised more questions than it was hoped it would answer.' 2 6
The Lehnert decision, even with its flawed test, follows precedent with

its constitutional inquiry into union security clauses in the public sector.
What is disturbing, however, is the likelihood that the Court, as it did
before in Beck, will continue to improperly blur the distinctions between
unions in different employment sectors. In Beck, the Court erroneously
relied upon its interpretation of the RLA to interpret the NLRA. 2 7 Yet
the RLA covers railway workers and airline employees, while the NLRA
pertains to private sector employees, and neither statute applies to public
sector unions such as the FFA in Lehnert. Despite these distinctions, for
the purposes of union security clauses the Court has compressed legislation from a number of contexts-the various state statutes, the NLRA
and the RLA-into one body of law with no firm grounding. In the

words of one commentator, what has emerged in the case law is a form of
"judicial legislation with no basis in... statute or the Constitution."' 28
124. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1975 (1991) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
125. Id. Notably, Scalia's substitution of a statutory standard is not a realistic alternative. His criterion for chargeability is that "a union cannot constitutionally charge nonmembers for any expenses except those incurred for the conduct of activities in which the
union owes a duty of fair representation to the nonmembers being charged." Id. at 1979
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
The majority rightly criticizes Scalia's approach as turning "constitutional doctrine on
its head." Id. at 1963. In other words, according to the majority, Scalia would interpret
the first amendment in light of a statute and not the other way around. See id.
126. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
127. See Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988); see
also Union Security Agreements, supra note 18, at 53-55 (criticizing the Beck decision for
relying on interpretations of the RLA); Unions Out On Street, supra note 17, at 667
(criticizing the Beck court's reliance on the RLA as "curious"); Implications of Beck,
supra note 82, at 1588 (pointing out that the Court in Beck relied solely on its interpretations of the RLA to decide how the NLRA should apply and had no independent
grounds in the NLRA for doing so).
128. Union Security Agreements, supra note 18, at 141. While the Court has found a
constitutional basis for limiting union security clauses under the RLA because state law is
preempted, see supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text, and has reached a constitutional conclusion in public sector cases because state action is involved, see supra note 6773 and accompanying text, it has not used a constitutional basis for deciding cases under
the NLRA, see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. It is, therefore, unexplainable
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Regardless of the lack of foundation for such an approach, the Court's
language and posture indicate that it intends its test in Lehnert to be
broadly applied to all unions and union security clauses, regardless of the
law under which dues objections may arise. 129 In essence, then, the
Supreme Court has arrived at its own version of a unified body of labor
law, built more on the development of judge-made concepts than on statutes or the first amendment. 13 While this may not be acceptable in a
field of law dominated by statute, it may be explainable.
On one hand, there exists an underlying tension between the first
amendment and union security clauses that forces the Court into disjointed decisions. This results because union security clauses compel

membership and thus clash with the first amendment protection of freedom of association and freedom of expression. 13 ' As one commentator

has remarked, "The Supreme Court's repeated efforts to reconcile the
Labor Act [NLRA] to the first amendment have trailed off into unintelli-

gibility.' 1 32 The result of this tension is the "judicial deconstruction"
of
133

the statutory law and the substitution of judicial legislation.
In the context of judicial deconstruction, the legislature authors text,
but the judiciary is the reader. Judicial deconstruction occurs when the

judiciary chooses to ignore explicit legislative intent and substitutes its
own reading of what the law should be. The danger in such an approach
why the Court has decided that the same constitutional standards apply to unions under
the NLRA when there is no state actor and no other constitutional basis for interpreting
the statute. The Court's sleight of hand was to claim that the RLA determines what the
NLRA should allow on dues collections for constitutionally protected rights.
129. Others have commented on the Court's cross-fertilization of the NLRA, the
RLA, and public sector law in relation to union security clauses. See Swoboda, supra
note 14, at H2, col. 1; NLRB GeneralCounsel Memorandum, supra note 84; see also Pilots
Against Illegal Dues v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 938 F.2d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 1991) (in
quoting Lehnert test in a case involving the RLA, circuit court concluded that "[t]hese
same characteristics presumably are required for chargeable expenses under the Railway
Labor Act") (emphasis added).
130. While this process blossomed in Lehnert, the Supreme Court hinted at such a
process before. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (in
interpreting the Taft-Hartley Act, the Court stated that some problems "will lack express
statutory sanction... [and t]he range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem").
131. See supra notes 52, 70 and accompanying text.
132. Kohler, supra note 75, at 149.
133. Judicial deconstruction has been identified and criticized before in other contexts.
In essence, it is based on the concept that there is no law until the judge pronounces it.
See, eg., Berger, "Original Intention" in HistoricalPerspective, 54 Geo. Wash. L Rev.
296, 303 (1985) (criticizing interpretation of a statute as "judicial deconstruction of the
words in disregard of the draftsmen's actual intention"); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term:
Leading Cases, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 137, 340 (1989) (noting that Patterson v. McClean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), represents "the beginning of a dangerous period of
judicial deconstruction of the major pieces of civil rights legislation-an erosion similar
to that which followed Reconstruction"); Spann, Deconstructingthe Legislative Veto, 68
Minn. L. Rev. 473, 536 (1984) (defining deconstruction as "the author does not 'control'
the meaning of the text; meaning emanates from an interactive process between the language of the text and the particular assumptions made by the reader").
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is manifest: legislative intent will take a back seat to judicial override.
The effect is evident in the consequences and confusion of Lehnert. As
noted earlier,' 3 4 Congress never intended courts to be involved in the
regulation of union expenditures and made no provisions for them to do
so. Once the Supreme Court decided that it was a proper area of judicial
inquiry, however, it was inevitable that the Court would have to create
the guidelines for regulating union expenditures. The confused holding
in Lehnert shows how ill-suited the Court is to its self-appointed task. 13.
III:

CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS

A.

Unions

Attacking union security clauses by challenging union expenditures
strikes at the heart of the labor movement. Indeed, as argued below, if
the Lehnert decision is applied or extended to all cases involving dues
objectors and union security arrangements it will ultimately prove to be
the death knell of the union security clauses originally sanctioned by
Congress in the Wagner Act.' 36 These security clauses provide labor
with one of its most important tools to maintain its identity and power.
Indeed, research reveals that "[m]ore than four-fifths of union contracts
contain some provision for union security."' 137 The campaign against
union security clauses thus threatens organized labor. As one commentator has argued, "Beneath the arguments over the union shop lies the
hard fact of a power struggle."' 38 Furthermore, when speaking of an
adverse decision in Lehnert, one union attorney predicted that it "could
have a 'dramatic effect on ...organized labor in general.' "139
The reporting and accounting obligations imposed on unions by the
courts and the NLRB are overly burdensome and costly. The cure, in
other words, is worse than the poison. One writer has noted that the
difficulty for unions with decisions like Lehnert arises not from lost dues
money, but from the expense and headache of trying to comply with
134. See supra note 40.
135. One commentator writing on Lehnert noted that the "Court is doomed to try to
untie the Gordian knot it has created" if it does not get out of the union expenditure
regulation business. See Mazurak, supra note 16, at 869.
136. See Swoboda, supra note 14, at H2, col. 1.
137. Henkel & Wood, Limitations on the Uses of Union Shop Funds After Ellis: What
Activities Are "Germane" to Collective Bargaining?,35 Lab. L.J. 736, 743 (1984).
138. Id. at 746. Looking behind lofty arguments concerning first amendment rights,
Judge Posner framed the issues in perhaps more realistic terms:
Two distinct types of employee will decline to join the union ....The first is the
employee who is hostile to unions on political or ideological grounds. The second is the employee who is happy to be represented by a union but won't pay
any more for that representation than he is forced to. The two types have potentially divergent aims. The first wants to weaken and if possible destroy the
union; the second, a free rider, wants merely to shift as much of the cost of
representation as possible to other workers.
Gilpin v. AFSCME, 875 F.2d 1310, 1313 (7th Cir. 1989).
139. Swoboda, supra note 14, at H2, cols. 3-4.
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"labyrinthine administrative procedures.""t
Moreover, it is estimated
that the cost of compliance will outweigh any lost revenues.' 4 '
With the demise of union security clauses, unions will lose an important benefit expressly granted them under the NLRA, and this could well
prompt a return to the labor strife that the Wagner Act was designed to
relieve.42 The seriousness of that strife cannot be underestimated. In
fact, as one scholar has pointed out, "[w]hen the President's Commission
on Violence reported in 1969 that the United States 'has had the bloodiest and most violent labor history of any industrial nation in the world,'
it alluded specifically to the 1930s."'1 3 Unionism, already in decline in
the United States, will thus suffer a telling wound 44 if Lehnert and its
140. Note, Beck and the NationalLabor Relations Board: An Analysis of Agency Fee
Objection Law and a Suggested Approach for the Board, 1990 Det. C.L. Rev. 633, 634
[hereinafter Agency Fee Objection Law].
141. See Swoboda, supra note 14 at H2, col. 4.
142. As one writer observed, "When passed, the National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act was perhaps the most radical piece of legislation ever enacted ....
Enacted in the
wake of the great strikes of 1934... [the Act] was essential to preserve the social order
and to forestall developments toward even more radical change." Klare, JudicialDeradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 265-66 (1978) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has referred to the "desirability of labor peace" as one of the
reasons that Congress allowed union security clauses. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977). In the summer of 1935, just prior to the passage of the Wagner
Act, over one million workers participated in 1,856 work stoppages. See Becker, Individual Rights and Collective Action: The Legal History of Trade Unions in America, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 672, 685 (1987) (citing I. Bernstein, Turbulent Years 217 (1969)). Becker's
article is a review of C. Tomlin's book, The State and the Unions: Labor Relations, Law
and the Organized Labor Movement in America, 1880-1960 (1985). The article presents
a summary of the view that labor movements and unions are antithetical to management
and capital, and that in accepting governmental assistance, unions also allowed themselves to be deradicalized. If organized labor concludes that it can no longer rely on
government fair dealing, it may seek traditional recourse.
143. W. Manchester, The Glory and the Dream 157 (1974).
144. Unions are in serious decline in the United States. 10.2 million workers in the
private sector are union members out of a total pool of 84.6 million. This represents but
12% of the private business labor force. Public sector unions add another 6.5 million
members. The aggregate total of private and public sector union members reveals that
unions represent only 16.1% of American workers, down from 34% in 1957 and 24% in
1973. See Silk, Worrying Over Weakened Unions, N.Y. Times, December 13, 1991, at
D2, col. 1.
When posed with the possibility of an end to unions, it is natural to ask "so what?"
This debate has interested other commentators and has provoked a large amount of literature on the subject. For a defense of unions as beneficial in economic cycles, see R.
Freeman & J. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (1984). These authors attempt to demonstrate "that in general productivity is higher in the presence of unionism than in its absence." Id at 163. Another work, while not completely critical or supportive of unions,
questions some of the results of the foregoing work. For instance, on the matter of increased productivity, it is argued that "the positive union productivity results... are a
chimera." B. Hirsch & 3. Addison, The Economic Analysis of Unions 215-16 (1986).
For a work that is wholly critical of unions, see M. Reynolds, Power & Privilege: Labor
Unions in America (1984).
More recently, former Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, George P.
Shultz, spoke out about the "possible harm to American industry and society stemming
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predecessors continue to be applied and continue to undercut union security clauses.
B.

Courts

The Lehnert case, rather than providing guidance to the lower courts,
has simply added to their uncertainty, confusion, and frustration. For
14 5
example, in Pilots Against Illegal Dues v. Air Line Pilots Association,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could not say with certainty,
but had to presume, that Lehnert should apply in a case arising under the
RLA. 146 Further, in Lucid v. City and County of San Francisco,147 a case

involving a public sector union, the district court, while applying the
Lehnert formula, balked at reviewing "every little item" to determine if
the union had properly categorized each as chargeable or not chargeable.' 48 The Court declared that it would "not be drawn into this microlevel of dispute resolution," and further pointed
out that this would rep149
resent a waste of federal judicial resources.
In a more recent instance, a circuit court focused on the issue of a full
union member who objects to a use of dues. In Kidwell v. Transportation
Communications International Union,'5° the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit distinguished Lehnert on grounds that will lead to further
confusion and difficulty for the Supreme Court should it have to decide
the first amendment issue raised in Kidwell. The Kidwell plaintiff, a
union member, argued that she should not be required to choose between
union membership and the concomitant right to vote on her working
conditions, on the one hand, and her first amendment rights on the
other.15 ' Because of this argument, the Kidwell case may well force the
Court to rethink whether union security agreements can any longer
with152
stand first amendment challenges, even from union members.
from the declining American labor movement." Silk, supra at D2, col. I. This is surprising support from a prominent figure in an administration generally regarded as strongly
anti-union. Yet, Shultz described unions as necessary restraints on management in the
workplace and stated that "'as a society, we have a great stake in freedom and a lot of
that is anchored somehow, historically,' in the labor movement." Id.
145. 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991).
146. See id. at 1127. This case involved airline pilots who objected to the use of their
agency fees for purposes not germane to collective bargaining. See id. at 1125. The case
arose under the RLA and the court inferred that the Lehnert formula, although fashioned
in a case involving a public sector union, should apply to RLA cases. See id. at 1127.
147. 774 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
148. See id. at 1238 n.4.
149. Id. (emphasis in original).
150. 946 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1991).
151. See id. at 287.
152. The Kidwell case involved a union member who objected to the use of union dues
for certain political activities. The implicated security clause arose under the RLA. The
Court noted that the case involved a union member, not a nonmember. As such, the
Court found that Lehnert did not apply, and that the union member had no right to
object to the use of union dues on first amendment grounds. See id. at 299-302.
By holding that union members must pay full dues, the Fourth Circuit has raised the
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In fact, given the concerns of the union member plaintiff in Kidwell,
the case raises issues of even greater importance than those in Lehnert. If
the Court reverses Kidwell and holds that union members can object to
(and hence pay less in) dues, the courts in effect will be determining dues
amounts. This would mean that the Court will have taken labor law far
from Congress's original intent in passing the Taft-Hartley Act--specifically, not to have outside
determination of union expenditures, dues, or
15 3

security arrangements.

C. NLRB Impact
If the Lehnert decision is read as controlling private sector union se-

curity clauses," 4 it will continue the transformation of the fundamental

mission of the NLRB. Congress created the NLRB to foster and facilitate the collective bargaining process. The NLRA, in fact, emphasizes

that "[i]t is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States... [to]

encourag[e] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 55 The
NLRB's main purpose is thus to carry out this policy. 156 The Supreme

Court, however, has altered the historical role of the NLRB with its decisions15 7 in the union security context by saddling the Board with ac-

possibility that financial core members might also have to pay full union dues. The
Supreme Court, however, has already determined that where a union security agreement
requires union membership, an employee becomes a member by paying dues and no
more. See NLRB v. General Motors, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). This implies that if a
collective bargaining agreement has a union security clause and not an agency fee arrangement, employees who pay dues are members and, under the Kidwell analysis, are
required to pay the same amount as all other members. In this way, Lehnert could be
pruned back to cover only agency shop arrangements.
It is equally possible, however, that the Supreme Court will find that union members
can get the same dues refund enjoyed by nonmembers and financial core members. Evidence that the Court may so broadly read its prior decisions in Beck and Abood is found
in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Austin involved a
challenge to corporate spending by members. See id.
at 654. In distinguishing the applicability of Abood and Beck on grounds that they involved unincorporated unions, the
Court noted that "union members who disagree with a union's political activities need
not give up full membership in the organization to avoid supporting its political activities." Id at 667. If the Court is to be taken literally, then it must follow that a union
member can refuse to contribute dues money to political activities and still be able to
enjoy full membership, including voting on contracts.
153. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. If the Supreme Court does hear the
Kidwell case, there may also be an issue of an unconstitutional condition, or something
analogous to it, in requiring an employee to choose between first amendment rights and
the right to vote on working conditions guaranteed by the NLRA. For a discussion of
the doctrine of unconstitutional condition (that government cannot condition the conference of a benefit on the giving up of a protected right), see Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 (1989).
154. This appears to be the early trend. See supra note 127-30 and accompanying text.
155. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
156. See id
157. It is worth noting that the NLRB filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the
Communication Workers of America in the Beck case. The agency pointed out that, in
the whole area of fragmenting dues, "[tihis is a path down which, in our view, the Court
should not travel any further." Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 29, Coin-
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counting and auditing functions."' 8 This has both burdened the NLRB
and undermined its credibility with unions.

As the NLRB, founded to work with unions, increasingly appears to

side with dissidents,15 9 it will likely be regarded with greater hostility by

organized labor. Unions, in fact, already view the Board with distrust.
In 1989, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland openly speculated that or-

ganized labor might be better off without the NLRB or NLRA.'"
D. Possible Solutions
As one commentator has succinctly stated,
the problem ... will not be [resolved] until the Court decides to cut
through its verbiage, reexamine the entire area and issue a decision
which says that either any allocation is a deprivation of an individual's
first amendment rights or that the typical union due [sic] is so small
that it is de minimis16to1 the individual's right of free association and
must be paid in full.

In essence, the conflict between dues objectors and union security clauses
is a judicially created problem that the Supreme Court must address in
the definitive manner suggested above. Until that happens, however,
there may be some other approaches available-some even suggested
previously by the Court.
Unions may be able to provide alternatives to financial core members
and nonmembers that alleviate concerns over first amendment rights.
One suggestion is to allow employees to specify the political areas in

which a union can commit funds. 162 This is a viable alternative because

it addresses the courts' concerns.
Specifically, courts have objected not to the collection of union dues
per se, but to the various uses to which dues are put. This admits of two
solutions upon a finding that a union has improperly applied dues: either
munication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (No. 86-637) (on file at Fordham Law Review).

158. The NLRB "employs two categories of field professionals: field examiners and
attorneys. It does not employ auditors or accountants," and thus is ill-suited for the task
assigned to it by the Supreme Court. Agency Fee Objection Law, supra note 140, at 669.
159. Dissenters in the private sector file charges against their unions with the NLRB.
The courts have placed the NLRB in the position of having to enforce Beck rights against
unions. See supra note 83 for an example of an NLRB General Counsel memorandum
instructing the agency on how to handle Beck cases.
160. See NLRB's Non-Existent for Us, Kirkland Says in Labor Talk, The Building

Tradesman, Sept. 15, 1989, at 1, col. 3. Kirkland is not alone in his call for ending the
NLRB. One commentator, for reasons different from those of Kirkland, criticized the
New Deal labor legislation and suggested that it should be replaced with common law.
See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor

Legislation, 92 Yale L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983). For a rebuttal, see Getman, The Common
Law, Labor Law and Reality: A Response to ProfessorEpstein, 92 Yale L.J. 1415 (1983).

161. Mazurak, supra note 16, at 869.
162. See Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 4 Ind. L.J.

527, 568-71 (1981).
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dues should be proportionally reduced, or full dues should be collected
but not misapplied. The Supreme Court has only fashioned
the former
63
remedy, despite the fact that nothing forbids the latter.1
In keeping with expressed legislative intent that union expenditures
not be subject to external regulation tM nor "free-riders" tolerated, 65 any
remedy should address concerns about the use of dues rather than simply

prohibit their collection. Allowing objectors to control the political
spending of their dues fits that dual scheme and still fulfills the first

amendment mandate that dues objectors not be forced to support political lobbying they may oppose. The proposed solution also avoids any
"free rider" concerns, while the Court's chosen path exacerbates that

problem.
Other union self-help measures could include: (1) open budget procedures that would allow referenda on specific budgetary items; 1 " and
(2) the segregation of dues from other monies (such as interest, invest-

ments, and grievance settlements) and the use of a separate fund for non-

collective bargaining167 activities. In the first case, the union would be

allowing its membership to express itself on possible political expenditures: in the latter, the union would not be using an objector's money in

impermissible ways and would not have to go through the administrative
nightmare of trying to justify expenditures.
It is, of course, possible for unions to refrain from performing any
political role or from carrying on functions outside the narrow confines
of the Court's reading of "germane." Such an approach aifpears selfdefeating and suicidal, however, as it would 16severely limit any hope unions have of obtaining favorable legislation. 1

Perhaps legislative action on the national and state levels is necessary
163. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), the Supreme
Court spoke about the segregation of a dues objector's money as a possible remedy. The
Court proposed that the union be made to reduce its expenditures on non-collective bargaining activities in proportion to the amount a dissenter contributed to the overall
budget. See idat 774-75. The majority cautioned, however, that the union "should not
be in a position to make up such sum from money paid by a nondissenter, for this would
shift a disproportionate share of the costs of collective bargaining to the dissenters and
have the same effect of applying his money to support such political activities." Id at
775.
164. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
166. This was suggested by the plaintiff's attorney after losing in Kidwell. See Hayes
& Berton, Union Members Can't Withhold Dues Over Politics Ruling Says, Wall St. J.,

Oct. 7, 1991, at B7, col. 3.
167. In Tierney v. City of Toledo, 917 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1990), the defendant union
tried such an approach with inconclusive results. The Court held that the union would
have to disclose the revenues and expenditures of this separate fund that was, according
to the union, used for non-collective bargaining activities. See id. at 938. Further, the
Court noted that the Supreme Court had only "tacitly endorsed remedies based upon the
proportion of total chargeable expenditures to total expenditures." Id. at 939. The Court
here, however, reserved judgmentupon the matter. See id
168. As one commentator has implied, it may not be in the interest of American society to still the only organized voice of its labor force. See Silk, supra note 144, at D2.
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to resolve the Beck and Lehnert issues. Congress could clarify the
NLRA and the RLA to specify that union security clauses require a full
share payment by all who receive the benefits of collective bargaining
agreements. As legislative history indicates, this was the original intention of the Congress that passed the Wagner Act.' 6 9
With the cooperation of unions, the NLRB itself could refer dues objector cases to binding arbitration. The NLRB can establish clear guidelines for chargeability to serve as reference for an arbitrator. This type of
procedure would free the NLRB from the current drag of cases involving
dues objectors. 7 Arbitration, moreover, is a quicker, less expensive process for all involved.'
Unions might therefore wish to cooperate with
an arbitration scheme because they would be able to seek declaratory
judgments as to the percentages of dues chargeable. This
would further
72
reduce delay, cost, and administrative inconvenience.1
CONCLUSION

Union security clauses were promoted by Congress under the Wagner
Act during the Great Depression. Congress sought to enshrine collective
bargaining as the centerpiece of the nation's labor policy, and the legislation of the period envisioned that vibrant unions were to play a key role
in carrying out that policy.
The closed shop authorized under the Wagner Act proved to be a potent organizing tool. Yet while, union strength grew remarkably, so did
the abuses of that new found status. Congress responded by eliminating
the closed shop and curtailing the effectiveness of union security clauses.
Nevertheless, Congress never intended its changes in the NLRA to be
used to divide the unified membership essential to a union's vitality.
Early Supreme Court decisions supported union security clauses
against first amendment challenges. Later decisions, such as Lehnert,
took a different course, reflecting a concern by the Court for protecting
the freedom of expression of nonmembers and financial core members.
Through questionable judicial approaches to the relevant statutory law,
the Court chose a path-not the only one available to it-that created a
weapon with which unions can be destroyed. If alternatives are not devised, the courts, the NLRB, and unions will be lost in a destructive
morass of judicial busy-work such as the kind Lehnert fosters. The end
will be a frustration of the role unions play in carrying out the expressed
"policy of the United States" of promoting effective collective
169. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The constitutional problems in the
public sector would still remain, however. This issue can best be addressed by the
Supreme Court. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
170. See Agency Fee Objection Law, supra note 140, at 670-71.
171. See id. at 673.
172. See Florey, FairShare Proceedings: A Casefor Common Sense, 44 Arb. J. 35, 44
(1989).
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bargaining. 1

173. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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DISSENT

Formula
Chargeable activities must:
(1) Be germane to
collective bargaining activity
(2) Be justified by govt.'s
vital policy interest in labor
peace & avoiding "free
riders"
(3) Not significantly add to
burdening of free speech
Chargeable Activities
I. Lobbying for contract
ratification
2. Pro-rata share of
chargeable activities of state
& national affiliates
3. De minimis costs of career
support services &
information
4. Costs of sending delegates
to national union conventions
5. Strike preparation costs,
even for a potentially illegal
strike

Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, Marshall

Scalia, O'Connor,
Souter, Kennedy
Formula
Chargeable activities
must be incurred in
performance of
union's statutory
duties

Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, Marshall
All

Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, Marshall

Scalia, O'Connor,
Souter, Kennedy

Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, Marshall
Blackmun, Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, Marshall, Kennedy

Scalia, O'Connor,
Souter, Kennedy
Scalia, O'Connor,
Souter

Nonchargeable Activities
1. Political lobbying outside
the context of contract
ratification
2. Public relations campaign
3. Expenses of an illegal
strike
4. Organizing or other costs
to promote unionism
generally

All except Marshall

Marshall

All except Marshall
All

Marshall

All except Marshall

Marshall

Note: The justice first listed wrote the relevant opinion.
Figure 1

